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On the existence of the true value of a probability.
Part 2: The representation theorem and the ergodic theory
Alberto H. Landro
1
Abstract: Some authors, basing their ideas on the exchangeability property, on the postulates
of the representation theorem and on its interpretation in the ambit of ergodic theory, believed
to find a counterexample to the subjectivist model through the theoretical justification of the
existence of an objective probability.  As a proof of the inconsistency of this reasoning, the
representation theorem allows to assert that the convergence of the relative frequency on a
“true value” of the probability is only a metaphysical illusion motivated by an asymptotic
behaviour of the personal assessments of initial probabilities, leading to intersubjective
assignment.  With regard to the ergodic theory, its assimilation to the propensity model allows
the demonstration of its metaphysical character and the resulting subjectivity in the assignment
of probabilities.
1.-Introduction
According to the statement in the first part of this work, even though the classical, frequentist,
logic and propensity interpretations, based on a deterministic conception, obtained objectivist
definitions of the probability associated with inference structures defined by rules of
interpretation, explicit or implicit, which define their identificatory model role of the true value
of the probability, it should be noted that: i) the classical model suffers from unavoidable
failures primarily related to its purely deductive character which prevents the contrast of its
agreement with the observable results of the phenomena; ii) the frequentist model is based on
the collective properties assumed as axioms that are not rigorously demonstrable; iii) the
logical model considers probabilities as assimilable to logical relationships in an ambit
consisting of abstract ideas and iv) the propensity model, despite Fetzer’s changes to Popper
and Miller’s proposal, cannot avoid its metaphysical character. 
On the contrary, it is further noted that the subjectivist model, which postulates the validity of
probability assessments mismatched with each other whenever they meet the condition of
coherence, leads to the conclusion that there is no truth about the probability, that there is no
true probability but infinite versions of the same probability. 
In addition, it is mentioned that some authors, basing their ideas on the exchangeability
property, on the principles of the representation theorem and on its interpretation in the ambit2
of ergodic theory, which allows to show that the probability distribution of a stochastic process
in certain conditions, can be defined in terms of averages in the time domain, raised the
possibility of the existence of objective probabilities that have a physical meaning and
therefore are not liable to subjective interpretation.
The claim of this second part is to demonstrate the inconsistency of this proposal from a
subjectivist approach to the property of exchangeability and the representation theorem and
the propensity nature (and therefore metaphysical) of the results of the ergodic decomposition
theorem. 
2.-The exchangeability property
The first attempts to define the exchangeability condition are related to the property of
equiprobability to sequences of binomial events (that admit alternatives   and  ) having the E E
same measure,  , with the same number,  , of results  .  n x E
Let a sequence of binomial events be bearing the form   that { } EE EE E iq i ix i x in , ,..., , ,..., , 21 +
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unknown. It is said that the events   are exchangeable if the probability distribution of the Ei
variable  , representing the number of results   to be obtained in the () {} En
Xn , ,,, . . . , ∈ 012 E
sequence of   trials: n
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(where   denotes the  -th difference of the sequence)
2, is defined by a function ( ) Δ
nx − • ( ) nx −
of the arguments   and   exclusively and is therefore independent of the order in which the x n
results  and   occur. A particular example of this type of exchangeable probabilities is the Ei Ei
one arising from the application of Laplace’s rule of succession. Suppose that in the succession
, according to the principle of insufficient reason, there is no reason to suppose that a () E
xn ,
value of   might be more likely than another, in other words, that the random variable  , p p
representing the probability “a priori” of the event   occurrence, is uniformly distributed in E
the interval  . The probability “a posteriori” “that the result of the  -th trial of [] 01 , ( ) n +1
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which exclusiveley depends on the values of   and  . x n
By using similar reasoning, other authors suggest assimilating the exchangeability to the
equality of probabilities conditioned by the same number of repetitions of the event or
considering as interchangeable those sequences of events for which the relative frequency  of
x
n
the event   is a sufficient estimator of their occurrence probability (in other words, those E




p xn ⎯→ ⎯
, n→ ∞3 The arguments discussed so far make up what might be called the “prehistory”
of exchangeability, which extends from its implicit consideration by the writers of the
eighteenth century (the first formal application of this property to the “coincidences
problem” in the “game of thirteen” is in Montmort, P.R. (1708)) to the derivation of
the rule of succession proposed by Ramsey, F.P. (1931) presumably from the
“postulate of the permutation” by his teacher W.E. Johnson (see Zabell, S.L. (1989)),
including a first explicit mention by Jules Haag at the International Congress of
Mathematics, Toronto, 1924. What could be considered the “history” of
exchangeability in this context begins with the publications of de Finetti, B. (1928)
(1930a), in which-to avoid the metaphysical assumptions stemming from the objectivist
interpretation of probability which make up the basis of previous attempts- he based
his reasoning on a rigorous definition of the concept of “random phenomenon” as one
whose repetitions generate a succession of interchangeable events.
4 de Finetti: “Predictions cannot be but probable. No matter how grounded a
prediction may seem, we can never be absolutely certain that the experience will not
disprove it, (...) This is why sciences are but applications of probability calculus (...)
So the most important issues associated with the meaning and value of a probability
are no longer isolated issues in a particular branch of mathematics and they assume
the role of fundamental gnoseological problems".
5 Bayes' theorem postulates that the probability of an  event   occurrence, E
conditioned by hypothesis   is proportional to the product of the probability of  by H E
the probability of   conditioned by   or, accordingly, that the probability of  H E E
conditioned by   is modified in the same direction and at the same magnitude as the H
probability of   conditioned by   (see de Finetti (1931a)(1931b)).  H E
4
Nevertheless, all these attempts of essentially objectivist definitions fail to characterize
exchangeability as a condition that goes beyondthe stochastic independence and seem to
suggest that it is a formal property and, apparently, completely independent from any approach
to the concept of probability
3. It was the subjective interpretation of this property which led
to a rethinking of not only the fundamentals of the probability. theory and the inference
methods but also of the more general problem of induction
4.
From a subjective approach, the property of exchangeability allows to solve some
controversies regarding the relationships between probability and frequency and the Bayes’
theorem, which constitutes the theoretical foundation of the learning process based on
experience that allows to coherently relate assignments of probabilities for different
information sets, transforming statistical inference in a particular case of inductive reasoning
5.
Because of its reference to the assignation of probability for a single event, this subjective
interpretation of Bayes' theorem as a special case of reasoning by induction is rejected by the
objectivist conceptions which, by the postulation of the existence of objective laws having6 de Finetti (1959): “Speaking of inductive reasoning means attributing some
value to this form of learning from experience, not considering it as the result of a
peculiar psychological reaction, but as a mental process amenable to analysis,
interpretation and justification. When this occurs, the tendency to overestimate the
reasoning to the point of excluding any other factors may cause detrimental bias. The
reason is an invaluable supplement to other intuitive faculties, but never a substitute
for them (...).  Since the non-tautological truths are based on more than reason, one
consequence of this bias is the rise of inductive reasoning to a standard status. Thus,
inductive reasoning is generally regarded as something of a lower level that generates
caution and suspicion. And still worse, inductive reasoning is subject to being dignified
by trying to change its nature by assimilating it to something that could almost be
considered deductive reasoning. In fact, there are often attempts to explain induction
without considering the term 'probability' or trying to remove it from its everyday
meaning, assimilable to a measure of the degree of belief attributed to the different
possible alternatives”.
5
more or less restrictive features that govern the behavior of phenomena, transform inductive
reasoning into deductive one
6. On the other hand, even if the " objectivist anathemas " are put
aside, this theorem by itself cannot justify, generally speaking, the assimilation of the
probability of an event occurrence to its relative frequency (in other words, it does not solve
the induction problem proposed by Hume), not due to a failure of the method but due to the
essential requirements of the subjectivist interpretation which condition such assimilation to
a coherent assignation of the initial probability and to the compliance with the exchangeability
condition.




















made at random with replacement, the probability od obtaining   red balls and   blue j ( ) nj −
balls conditioned by the assumption of a partition defined by the composition of the urns (in
other words, the probability that the variable relative frequencyof the result   conditioned () E
r






































The probability of obtaining   red balls and   blue balls when   withdrawals with j ( ) nj − n7 In the same way as in the case analyzed in previous pages, the expression in
terms of finite differences of this equation gives the successive effect of the observed
frequencies over the probabilities “a priori”.
6
repacement are made from an urn selected at random will be defined, then, by a mix of
binomial distributions in which the weighings are given by the probabilities of the various
urns, in the following way
7:
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 is true and     denotes the probability of drawing a red ball, ( ) iM =12 ,, . . . , pi ( ) iM =12 ,, . . . ,
conditioned by the hypothesis  , with a distribution function  . As it will be Hi ( ) [] ( ) Fxx M ∈ 01 ,
discussed in Section 4, in accordance with the principles of the repreentation theorem it can
be assured that, given a sequence   of exchangeable events, this mix of { } EE E n 12 ,, . . . ,, . . .
binomial probabilities defining the probability function   generated by this sequence, ( ) ( ) pE
jn ,
is unique.
It should be noted that in order to avoid ambiguity, de Finetti (1930c) calls “event” a strictly
defined unique case and uses a more general notion of “random phenomenon”, which
considers an event as the result of “each trial repeated under homogeneous boundary
conditions for this phenomenon “. In other words, a "random phenomenon" deFinettiano is one
which repetitions generate a sequence of exchangeable events. However, given that from a
subjective approach events are unique in time and space, the hypothesis that the repetitions of
an event are part of the same phenomenon is just a conjecture, which leads to the inevitable
conclusion that the condition of exchangeability admits an interpretation of purely subjective
characteristics.
Translating de Finetti’s definitions to Carnap’s nomenclature, we can say that the necessary
and sufficient condition for the probabilities distribution corresponding to the “state

























⎟ 12 ,, . . . ,
strict sense and, therefore, interchangeable, is that the are isomorphic. The disjunction of all
the isomorphic state descriptions is calle a “structural description” by Carnap, so that the
condition of exchangeability is comparable to that equiprobability of all disjunctions of a8 An alternative way to avoid conceptual ambiguities of the notion of event so
frequently found in the literature, may be obtained by substituiting the term “events”
or “experiments” by “individuals” classified in  mutually exclusive and collectively k
exhaustive classes, according to a set of predicates  .Each individual is { } QQ Q k 12 ,, . . . ,
assimilable, in this case, to random withdrawal of the domain  . { } EE E n 12 , ,..., ,...
9 As noted in the previous section, although the relative frequency  can be
considered as a particular value of the variable   and, therefore, it can define a ( ) E
jn ,
singular  "verifiable"  event, it should be considered that this interpretation
ofexchangeability as comparable to independence conditioned by a random variable
does not belong to the case when  . n→ ∞
10 It should be noted that the condition of stochastic independence (or
"probabilistic" according to de Finetti’s nomenclature) does not define a relationship
among events, but it is a subjective property of the joint probabilities function.
11 From Savage, J. (1954) and Hewitt, E., Savage, L.J. (1955) a strong
international interest in the subjective interpretation of exchangeability was generated




From the expression given above, from a purely formal point of view and according to an
objectivist approach, the condition of exchangeability is assimilated to that of stochastic
independence conditioned by a constant but unknown probability (in other words, conditioned
by a probability defined by a random variable). This leads to the conclusion that every
sequence of independent events with constant probability is interchangeable.
de Finetti  (1934) considered that this interpretation of exchangeability is incorrect to the
extent that, in terms of a sujective approach, the idea of unknown probability is meaningless,
that the probability varies from trial to trial according to the experience acquired by the
observer and that it is the limit frequency, often improperly assimilated to an objective
probability, which is unknown and with a distribution that varies according to the results of
the realizations of the event
9. Independence would exist if it were certainly known that the
hypothesis   is true. Otherwise, since the same results can occur under various hypotheses, Hi
the probability of the extractions’ results is conditioned by these assumptions and the
probability of the truth of each hypothesis depends on the observed frequencies, the
independence of events cannot be assumed. It should be noted that, from a subjective
approach, the condition of exchangeability and its generalizations are not linked with causal
independence, but with “probabilistic independence”
10, which means “not merely the absence
of any causal relationship but also the absence of any influence on our view on the probability
assignment”
11.(1978), Koch, G.; Spizzichino, F. (eds.)(1982), Daboni, L.; Wedlin, A. (1982),
Scozzafava, R. (1982)(1990),  Aldous, D.J. (1985),  Viertl, R. (ed.)(1987), Diaconis,
P. (1987), Regazzini, E. (1988)(1991), Petris, G.; Secchi, P. (1989), Cifarelli, D.M.;
Muliere, P. (1989), Piccinato, L. (1991), Gilio, A. (1992), Coletti, G.; Dubois, D.;
Scozzafava, R. (eds.)(1994), Berti, P.; Rigo, P. (1994), Petris, G.; Regazzini, E. (1994),
Bernardo, J.M.;Smith, A.F.M. (1994).
12 See Section 4.
13 See Chatterji, S.D. (1974a)(1974b), Kingman, J.F.C. (1978).
8
The exchangeability treated so far involves cases in which the experiment is indefinitely
repeatable and is known as "unlimited". de Finetti (1937) also defined a type of “limited” or
finite exchangeability, corresponding to those sequences of events (which he called
“equivalent”) that cannot continue beyond a given limit (the typical example would be that of
withdrawals without replacement).
de Finetti (1933a)(1933b)(1933c) extended the definition of exchageability to the random
variables. It is said that a sequence of random variables   is { } XX X X n = 12 , ,..., ,...
exchangeable if, for any set of   elements   from  , it is verified that, for n { } XX X n 12 ,, . . . , X
each value   belonging to a set ofhypothesis   over  , the   have the same θ Θ X ( ) Xi n i =12 ,, . . . ,
conditional probability distribution:
( ) ( ) ( ) [] {}
( ) [] ( ) ( ) ( )
pX x X x X x
F x x x Fx Fx Fx
i i i i in in
ii i n n
11 22
12 1 2
≤∩ ≤∩ ∩≤ =
==
... /
, ,..., / / / ... /
θ
θθ θθ
From this expression one can conclude that the variables compound an infinite exchangeable
sequence are positively correlated
12 .
Note that, similar to the previous case, the concept of exchangeability of random variables can
also be interpreted as equivalent to the concept of independence conditioned by a partition of
hypotheses and in addition, it is possible to distinguish between limited and unlimited
exchangeability.
Obviously, if the variables  are independent andidentically distributed, in other XX X n 12 , ,...,
words, such that    , then they are exchangeable. As it will be ( ) ( ) Fx F x i = ( ) in =12 ,, . . . ,
discussed in Section 4, generally speaking, de Finetti’s theorem of representation shows that
for each property inherent in the iid sequences, there is a similar property for exchangeable
sequences
13. Conversely, given a finite exchangeable sequence, it is possible to establish some9
inequalities that link it to a sequence of iid variables. Let, for example, a set  of {} XX X = 12 ,
exchangeable variables and two increasing functions   and  , then it will be ( ) gX 1 ( ) gX 2
verified that   (for all   and  ) and, therefore, that ( ) ( ) [] ( ) ( ) [] gx gx gx gx 11 12 21 22 0 −− ≥ x1 x2
. Then, if the expected values exist, it can be ( ) ( ) [] ( ) ( ) [] {} EgX gX gX gX 11 12 21 22 0 −− ≥
concluded that the condition of exchangeability implies that
. Note that, if verified that  , the above ( ) ( ) [] ( ) ( ) [] Eg X g X Eg X g X 11 21 11 22 ≥ XX 12 ⊥
relationship would be reduced to Chebyshev’s inequality,
. ( ) ( ) [] ( ) [] ( ) [] Eg X g X Eg X Eg X 11 22 11 22 ≥
On the other hand, given a sequence of random variables   so that  , { } XX X = 12 , ,... ( ) EX j <∞
it can be said that there is a non-random sequence of integers,  , so that the limit 1 12 ≤<< jj ...
of the sub-sequence  ,  , exists almost {} { } XX XX x x x kk j j j k













with certainty. Now then, it is shown that any finite sequence   dense { } XX XX nn = 12 ,, . . . ,
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converges in distribution to an exchangeable sequence.
3 .- The convergence to intersubjectivity
As discussed in the previous section, from the application of the rule of succession it is
obtained that, in the case of exchangeable events, the probability that the outcome of the










































Then, when  , the convergence shall be verified towards the equiprobability of the events n→∞
“to obtain   results   in   trials” and “to obtain   results   in   trials”, in other x E n x +1 E n +1
words, whatever the coherent value assigned to initial probabilities, it will be verified that14 In fact, this convergence should be interpreted as an in-probability
convergence. For convergence in the sense of the analysis, exchangeability is not a
sufficient condition. According to a particular case of general theorem proposed by
Gaifman, H. (1971), the necessary condition for such convergence is that the
proportion of red balls will be distributed in accordance with a function that assigns a
zero probability to the hypothesis that this share is in the range   or assign a non- ( ) 01 ,
null value to the probability that the hypothesis falls within a range   (for ( ) ab ,
). 01 ≤<≤ ab
15 A representative example of the transformation of the initial probabilities
using Bayesian conditioning scheme is given by the aforementioned rule of succession,
10































in de Finetti’s nomenclature, the convergence implies a “practical certainty”, not an
“absolute” or logic “certainty”
14.
This result leads to two conceptually opposing postulations. From an objetivist point of view,
it can be interpreted as a confirmation that, for sequences of exchangeable events, the true








frequency of the outcome  . As discussed in the next section, from a subjectivist approach, E
it means recognozing that this postulated “true value” of the probability is not but a
metaphysical illusion, that the fact that convergence to relative frequency is verified for any







of the assignment of initial probabilities because of the increase of empirical information,
through the “Bayesian conditioning”, which creates an intersubjective assignment easily
confused with an objective probability.
With respect to this convergence to intersubjectivity, it should be noted that if the general
assumptions adopted by observers about the nature of the event considered are correct (in a








Bayesian conditioning process is an aceptable justification, but, if the evaluation of the
boundary conditions that define the characteristics of the event is wrong, then all subjective
probabilities conditioned by evidence will be inappropiate. For the final probabilities to be








allowed by the very conservative scheme of Bayesian conditioning
15, a circunstance that wouldused to address D. Hume’s problem of induction about the assessment of the
probability that the sun appears tomorrow once again (known in the literature as the
“problem of dawn”). Considering the records of the last 5000 years, it is found that the
sun rose every morning for 1,826,250 days. According to the rule of succession being
, the probability of dawn breaking tomorrow will be approximately xn == 1 826 250 ., ,
equal to 0.9999994. Now, suppose that tomorrow the sun will not rise, it will be
verified that   and that   and, therefore, in accordance with the x n =− 1 n =1 826 251 ,. ,
conservative “spirit” of Bayesian conditioning, the probability that the sun appears the
next day will be approximately equal to 0.9999989. This decrease of 0.00005% in the
assessment of the probability of a new dawn after entering information that wills
certainly generate such a state of confusion that will lead to assume that the sun will
never appear again determined by the rule of succession, looks, at least, inappropiate.
16 This confirms the pragmatism-relativism and the non-axiomatic nature
attribuited to exchangeability by de Finetti (see Section 6).
17. Consider, for example, the sequences originated in the "game of red or blue"
proposed by Feller, W. (1950) or from the chaotic clock by Albert, M. (1992)(1999).
Popper, K.R. (1957) used the game of red or blue to criticize what he called the "simple
induction rule" and, consequently, de Finetti’s  reduction to exchangeability and the
1983 issue of the same work, to prove (it could be said, in vain) the impossibility of the
existence of an inductive logic (see Gillies, DA (1996)).
11
be in flagrant contradiction with de Finettiano’s principle of “reduction to exchangeability”
16.
It should further be noted that, if the condition of exchangeability is not verified, this
transformation scheme of initial probabilities (subjective), it would generate sequences of
probabilities totally unrelated to reality. This restriction could be solved by considering a
broader set of hypotheses that could include, for example, speculations about chaotic
behavior
17, but this alternative would render meaningless the process of Bayesian conditioning.
4.-The representation theorem
From the definition of unlimited exchangeability, the representation theorem allows to solve
the essential problem of the theory of probability, which consists of interpreting its
relationships with inductive reasoning through the aforementioned Bayesian scheme of
learning from experience. This limit theorem shows how a probability law for exchangeable
events formally approaches a law for independent events in which the probability “a priori”18 Note that although the notion of exchangeability and the limit theorems
consequently shown describe the process of learning from experience, the limits of the
distributions that can be said to represent this Bayesian conditioning are not strictly
defined.
19 Link, G. (1980).
20 Note that the above realtionship holds for all  with the same function  . x ( ) Fx X
21 In addition to the first definition of exchangeable events, in 1928 Haag, J. had
already proposed an incomplete demonstration of this theorem.
22 Curiously, this theorem was not fully appreciated until late 1940's. Fréchet,
M. (1943) makes a casual reference to it as “a formula obtained by Khinchin and de
Finetti”. In this regard it is worth mentioning Kyburg, H.E., Smokler, H.E.
(eds.)(1964): “In a sense the mos important concept in the subjective theory of
probability is the one of ‘exchangeable events’. Until the introduction of this concept
(by de Finetti (931)) the subjective theory of probability was not but a philosophical
12
of the occurrence of the result   is given by its relative frequency
18. E
Let consider a scheme that consist in the randomly selection of a number  , that [] X ∈ 01 ,
represents the proportion of red balls in the   urns, according to a unique distribution M → ∞
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(where   represents the “credibility”
19 that the observer attributes to the () ( ) pE x
jn , /
conditioning hypothesis   and   is a derivable function)
20. This representation theorem x ( ) Fx X
statement (proposed by de Finetti (1937a))
21 shows that, if the probabilities “a priori” are
distributed according to a unique distribution function   then the events   are ( ) Fx X () E
jn ,
interchangeable and that the reverse implication is also true: given a probability distribution
, exchangeable for every   positive integer, there is only one such distribution () ( ) pE
jn ,
n
function   satisfying the representation formula, in other words, there is just one mix of ( ) Fx X
binomial probabilities that defines it
22.curiosity. None of those for whom the probability theory was a subject of knowledge
or application paid much attention to it. It shoul be noted that the introduction of the
‘equivalence’ or ‘symmetry’ or exchangeability’ concept, as known at present,
provided the link between the notion of subjective probability and the classical
problem of inductive inference”.
23 Note that de Finetti’s representation theorem demonstration is based on the
application of the definition of characteristic function to exchangeable probabilities.
According to the original notation, de Finetti obtained that

























∫ θθ θ θ θ
1 1 1 Φ
the characteristic function is defined and its limit is calculated, the probabilities
 remain uniquely determined (the basics of this demonstration method can be () ( ) pE
xn ,
13
Generalizing the above result, the probability that in the following   trials   results   y m h E
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this proves that, given the information on the outcome of the first   trials, the following  n m
trials are exchangeable, but such that, for large enough   values, the probability   that m ( ) dF x X
the relative frequency assumes a value in the range of the interval   is modified in a [ ] xx d x , +
directly proportional way to  , becoming  . So the probability on the peak  ( ) xx
j nj 1−





grows when   increases indefinitely, which asymptotically leads to the assumption of n
independence and equiprobability of the trials with equal probability to the observed
frequency. As discussed in the previous section, from a subjetivist interpretation, this result
justifies the reasons that lead to associate -inteasubjectively- the probability of certain events
to the frequency observed in similar events, replacing the unknown objective probabilities and
the concept of independence by subjective probabilities and exchangeability
23.found in Poincaré, H. (1896), Borel, E. (1909) y Castelnuovo, G. (1925-28)).
24 From these predictive probabilities de Finetti (1952) proposed the
exchangeability “degenerate case” as the one in which such probabilities assume the
values 0 or 1 (see Daboni. L. (1953)).
25 See Dacunha-Castelle, D. (1974).
26 With respect to the conceptual aspects of this theorem, it would be mentioned
the contributions of Braithwaite, R.B. (1957), Good, I.J. (1965), Jeffrey, R.C. (1965),
Hintikka, J. (1970), Spielman, S. (1976)(1977), Skyrms, B. (1980), Suppes, P.; Zanotti,
M. (1980), von Plato, J. (1981), Suppes, P. (1984), Dawid, A.P. (1985), Zabell, S.L.
(1988), Howson, C.; Urbach, P. (1989), Mura, A. (1989)(1992), Gorlino, P. (1990),
Sahlin, E. (1993), Weschler, S. (1993).
14
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24. ( ) fx X
On the other hand, every exchangeable sequence   has the selection { } XX X X k = 12 ,, . . . ,
property, whereby, given a non-random sequence of integers of the forma  , 1 12 ≤<< < jj j k ...
it is verified that     . However, since ( ) Fx x x XX X j j j jj j k k 12 12 , ,..., ,, . . . , = ( ) Fx x x XX X k k 12 12 ,, . . . , , ,...,
for a finite sequence of variables,  , the selection property only provides { } XX X k 12 ,, . . . ,
information on   marginal variables, the inverse implication is not necessarily verified. k −1
Only if the sequence of variables is infinite, the implication is verified in both ways
25. This
shows that the selection property (apparently not as strict as the exchangeability property) is
a sufficient condition to ensure the principles of the representation theorem
26.27 See, Landro, A.H. (2010a).
28 de Finetti (1970): “The assumption of countable additivity (...) is now
commonly accepted; even though it was not originated with Kolmogorov‘s axioms
(1933), it was systematized in these axioms. Its success is largely due to the
mathematical convenience of turning the calculation of probabilities into a simple
transfer of modern measurement theory (...) No one has provided any real justification
of countable additivity (one which goes beyond its consideration simply as a 'natural
extension' of finite additivity)”.
15
From the previous results we can conclude that the representation theorem is only verified for
infinite exchangeable sequences. Note, for example, that infinite exchangeable sequences
negative correlations between the variables may appear that, therefore, cannot be conditionally
independent or identically distributed. Let a sequence   be of { } XX X X n = 12 ,, . . . ,
exchangeable variables such that  ,  and ( ) EX i <∞( ) in =12 ,, . . . , ( ) σσ
22 Xi = ( ) ρρ XX ij , =
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according to a symmetric multinomial function). 
This necessary condition of infinity for the succession of exchangeable variables,
paradoxically contradicts de Finetti’s considerations (1931a)(1931b)(1970) with respect to the
axiom of numerable additivity
27 about the fact that, although it is reasonable to accept the
representativity of a judgement on the behavior of an observable fact, from a positivist position
it is unrealistic to assume that it is possible to judge something that has no empirical meaning,
such as the infinite domain events
28. Moreover, this leads to the conclusion that, according to
a subjetive interpretation, the representatation theorem does not allow an explanation in terms
of parametric estimation and, therefore, within the scope of inference, de Finetti’s  result must
be assumed according to his weakest formulation (objectivist), whereby the necessary and
sufficient condition for the events   to be exchangeable is that, conditioned by a random ( ) E
jn ,
element  , the joint probability distribution for any finite sequence should be the same.  x
5- Partial exchangeability
As discussed in the previous section, the condition of exchangeability should be considered
as a limiting case in which the analogy between the events is “absolute” or “complete”.
However, given a sequence of events  , divided into   classes, in the { } EE E n 12 ,, . . . ,, . . . k29 Note that the sequence of probabilities   defined in Section 2 is () ( ) pE
nn , ⎧ ⎨ ⎩
⎫ ⎬ ⎭
replaced, in this case, by a  -dimensional sequence having the form k
. () ( ) pE
nn nnn n kk 12 12 , ,..., , , ,..., ⎧ ⎨ ⎩
⎫ ⎬ ⎭
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applications there are usually cases in which, while events can be regarded as “of the same
kind”, so that within each class they can be considered exchangeable from the point of view
of probability, they present some observable differences among different classes. It is said that
this sequence is partially exchangeable of order   if there exists a unique probability, k
, that in   trials   results   occur (where the values  () ( ) pE
nn n k 12 ,, . . . ,
n nn n k 12 , ,..., E nn n k 12 , ,...,
denote the number of trials made on each of the classes, such that  )
29. Then, nn nn k 12 ++ += ...
the probability that in   events    results   and nn n k 12 ++ + ... jj j k 12 , ,..., E
 results   occur, will be: hn j hn j hn j kkk 111 222 =− =− =− , ,..., E
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For a given vector  , the   values  [] nn n k 12 ... ( )( ) ( ) nn n k 12 11 1 ++ + ... () ( ) pE
jj n n kk 11 ,..., , ,...,
 define the probabilities of the  possible combinations of ( ) 0≤≤ jn ii ( )( ) ( ) nn n k 12 11 1 ++ + ...
the   relative frequencies. Let     the distribution function k ( ) Fx x x nn n k k 12 12 ,, . . . , , ,..., ( ) 01 << xi





i ≤ ( ) ik =12 ,, . . . ,17
as in version of the representation theorem analyzed in the previous section, when
, it is verified that  . So it ( ) nn n k 12 ,, . . . , →∞ ( ) ( ) F x xxF x xx nn n k X X k kk 12 1 12 12 , ,..., ,..., ,, . . . , ,, . . . , →
will be:
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( ) ( ) ( )








































































∫∫ ( ) ..., ,..., ... Xkk k xx d x d x 11
(assuming that, in this last expression, the function   admits a density function such that ( ) Fx X






















example, if classes are indiscernible from the point of view of the probability), the numbers
 depend exclusively on  , the operators   are all () ( ) pE
nn k 1,...,
nn n n k =++ + 12 ... ΔΔ Δ 12 , ,..., k







































nn n n k =++ + 12 ...
 exclusively and the function   is concentred on the jj j j k =++ + 12 ... ( ) Fx x x XX k k 1 12 ,..., , ,...,
line  . On the contrary, if the classes are independent, then xx x k 12 == = ...
, the differences   operate () ( ) ( ) ( ) pE p E p E p E
nn n n n
k
n kk 12 1 2
12
, ,..., ... ⎛
⎝ ⎜ ⎞
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⎠ ⎟ ,, . . . ,
obtained that    . That is, it is () ( ) pE












verified that  and, in the limit, that ( ) Fx x nn k k 1 1 ,..., ,..., = ( ) ( ) ( ) Fx Fx Fx nn n k k 12 12 ...
.  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Fx x x F x F x F x XX X k X X X k kk 12 1 2 12 1 2 ,, . . . , , ,..., ... =
Suppose we have the information that, in   trials in the   classes, nn n n k =++ + 12 ... k
 results   and   results  occurred and let the events be: jj j j k =++ + 12 ... E hh h h k =++ + 12 ... E



















⎟ 12 12 ,, . . . , ; ,, . . . , l
sequence of results that occurred in the  -th permutation of trials made inclass   ( ) l i =12 , ,...,k30 The interpretation of the exchangeability condition as one that allows the
translation of the vague notion of “analog random items” to a probabilistic language
is based on a subjective concept and the solution to the problem of induction through
the asymptotic theorem for predictive distributions is obviously subjective. “... A
perfectly logical solution in itself to the extent that when one seeks to eliminate all
subjective factors the only achievement, with varying degrees of success, is to hide
them, but never avoiding a gap in logic. It is true that in many cases in which the
18
and ii)  . The probability that in class   a result   occurs in the  -th trial AA A A k = 12 ... i Ei ( ) n + l
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( ) ... ... ,..., ,..., dx x dx dx dx f x x ii i i k X X k k −+











(assuming that   it admits a density function  )
30, and ( ) Fx x XX k k 1 1 ,..., ,..., ( ) fx x XX k k 1 1 ,..., ,...,experience is important- such as in the exchangeability hypothesis-these subjective
factors never have a pronounced influence. Whilst this is very important to explain
how, under certain conditions, a more or less close agreement is produced between
predictions that different individuals produce, it also shows that differing views are
always legitimate” (de Finetti (1937a)).
31 Note that, as in the case of exchangeability, this convergence to
intersubjectivity depends basically on incomplete knowledge of a qualitative nature of
the function  . ( ) Fx X
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1 1 1 11 11 ,..., ,..., ,..., ... ,...,
∗ =− − α
Likewise, the probability that in   additional trials   results   and mm m k 12 ++ + ... jj j k 12 ++ + ... E
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As in the case of exchangeability it can be concluded that, conditioned by the   trials result, n
the remaining trials are partially exchangeable, but its limit distribution,  , is modified ( ) Fx X
in direct proportion to   and the probabilities in the environment of the values ( ) α xx x k 12 ,, . . . ,
























⎟ , ,..., ( ) nn n k 12 ,, . . . , →∞
leading to an intersubjective situation that considers the independence of the trials and the
assimilation of probabilities to the observed frequencies in each class
31.
6 .- The principle of reduction to exchangeability 
If in the representation theorem it is assumed, in particular, that the variable   is uniformly x















132 For a detailed treatment of Markovian processes, see Landro, A.H.; González,
M.L. (2009).
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 (where     denotes a Beta function). This corollary demonstrates the ( ) xn = 012 ,,, . . . , ( ) B •• ,
formal linkage between the concepts of exchangeability and independence. As it has already
been mentioned, the fact that the relationship is purely formal implies that the equations
formulated from an objectivist viewpoint from the condition of stochastic independence can
be interpreted from a subjectivist point of view from subjective probabilities and
exchangeability. This reinterpretation led de Finetti to formulate the principle of "reduction
to exchangeability" in order to eliminate the "nebulous" "metaphysical" concepts of objective
probability and independence (essential in the formulation of the law of large numbers and of
the limit central theorem) precisely in favour of the subjective probability and exchangeability.
From a diametrically opposite conceptual position, the objectivist authors propose what might
be called a principle of reduction to independence, which considers that the exchangeability
assumption would only be applicable in situations of objective independence, but this
application would be redundant since the problem could be addressed simply by using the
concepts of independence and objective probability.  On the other hand, if the situation were
of non-independence, the use of the exchangeability condition would lead to erroneous results
and, therefore, should be avoided. 
de Finetti replied to these objections on the grounds that, considering that exchangeable events
are formally equivalent to equally probable events of objective independence, different
subjective forms equivalent of non-independent events can be introduced (and, in particular,
of Markov’s chains, giving rise to events that could be called exchangeable-Markovian)
32. So,
instead of assuming the classical exchangeability hypothesis, different forms of Markovian
exchangeability can be considered assigning each one an initial (subjective) probability. 
It is obvious that (contrary to de Finetti’s views) this generalization leads to such great
complications that make it inapplicable. It should be noted that, in accordance with this
extension, it would be necessary to consider all possible types of dependence that could occur
in a sequence of events and assign each of them a probability “a priori”.  Obviously, it would
be impossible to ensure that “all” possible forms of dependence had been taken into account
in each case, not to mention assuming that it is possible to assign individual probabilities “a
priori” to each of them. 
This restriction led to the erroneous conclusion that, as from an objectivist interpretation, the
analysis of a sequence of events just requires the consideration of only one initial hypothesis:
independent events with constant probability with no need to consider “a priori” any
alternative hypothesis of dependency or variable probabilities; the only way to avoid33 This development known as “abstract theory of dynamic phenomena” derives
from the process behaviour interpretation in terms of classic mechanics.
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complications associated with the widespread of reduction to exchangeability is from an
objective approach. 
In response to these considerations, it should be noted that since statistical tests allow only a
methodological falsation, it is impossible to strictly verify the accuracy of the initial hypothesis
of “proven objective independence”, which shows its subjective nature and, therefore,
invalidates the alleged redundancy of the exchangeability condition.
7 .- The ergodic theory
7.1 .- The decomposition theorem
As discussed, according to the principle of reduction to exchangeability, de Finetti considers
interchangeable probabilities as subjective ones and binomial probabilities as objective
probabilities that should be eliminated. The question to be analyzed in this section is whether
this principle applies to more general classes of events in which the principle of insufficient
reason is not allowed as an assumption.
Given that from an objectivist interpretation, the concept of ergodic probability means the
greatest generalization of the stochastic independence property, we can consider the
representation of stationary probabilities using unique mixtures of ergodic probabilities as the
most general expression of the principle of exchangeability reduction. However, the
uniqueness of mixtures condition creates situations in which the role of ergodic probabilities
distribution   has a physical meaning to which many authors have assigned an objective ( ) Fx X
nature, which could be interpreted as an exception to that principle.
Ergodic theory begins with Boltzmann, L.’s attempt (1868) to represent the probability
distribution of a stochastic process in terms of averages in the time domain
33. Given a
stochastic process, continuous in the domain of states and continuous in the time domain and
a function   in the domain  of states, the expected value of the function   in the ( ) gX ( ) Ω X g
domain   is defined by  , where   denotes a density function. Likewise, Ω ( ) ( ) gx f xd x X
Ω
∫ ( ) fx X
let a region  be, replacing the function   by an indicator function of  ,  , then ( ) AX ∈Ω g A I A
 will be verified. Let, on the other hand,   the law that ( ) ( ) ( ) Ix fx d xp A AX
Ω
∫ = ( ) TtX ,
determines the trajectory of the process be  , so that if  , then  . ( ) { } Xt ( ) Xx 0 = ( ) ( ) Xt Ttx = ,34 If   were invertible, in addition, it would be verified that ( ) Txt ,
. ( ) ( ) [] MA MT tA =
−1 ,
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Suppose that this transformation is measure-preserving (or natural), that is, such that
 (where   denotes the class of all probability measures)
34. The average ( ) [] ( ) MTtA MA , = ( ) M •






→∞ ∫ lim ,
1
0
the function   by an indicator function  , this average (assimilable to a law of large g I A
numbers) can be interpreted as the average time to stay in the region   by the process, which A
was in the state   at time 0. The fundamental problem of ergodic theory, then, is to show that x
the average of the process in the time domain exists (stationarity condition), that is unique (that
is, independent from the initial state of the process) and that the average in the states domain
can be calculated as an average in the time domain,   (that ( ) ( ) ( ) [] gxf xd x
t




→∞ ∫ ∫ lim , 1
0 Ω
is, to show that the probability   can be objectively expressed exclusively as the time ( ) pA
average to stay by the process in the region  ). A
Let, in particular, a space   be formed by infinite binomial sequences  , Ω {} EE E E n = 12 , ,..., ,...
let   the  -th element of a sequence of   and let a transformation   be similar to the ( ) xE n n E T
one mentioned above, so    , resulting in  . This ( ) ( ) xT E x E nn = +1 ( ) n =12 ,, . . . ( ) ( ) xEx T E n
n
+ = 11
transformation represents the repetition of the binomial sequence trial  {} EE E E n = 12 , ,..., ,...
and its application provides the result to be achieved in the next repetition, that is, the sequence
 defines a realization or trajectory of the process. It is said that a probability ET ETE ,, , . . .
2
 on   is a stationary measure if for every set  , it is verified that  ( ) p • Ω A⊂ Ω ( ) ( ) pT A pA
n − =
, that is, if the probabilities functions on finite sequences of events remain invariant ( ) n =12 ,, . . .
over time.
Suppose that, in particular,   and    represent the possible outcomes of Ei =1 Ei = 0 ( ) i =12 ,, . . .
a binomial phenomenon, the stationarity property is a necessary and sufficient condition to











given an integrable function, the limit of the average in the time domain,










( ) mg E
realizations of the process will have the same asymptotic properties with a probability equal35 As a corollary of this statement one can conclude that the laws of large
numbers are special cases of the ergodic theorem and that, consequently, the basis for
the frequentist interpretation of the probability is not the particular condition of
independence, but the most general property of ergodicity of the sequence of
repetitions generated by the random phenomenon.
36 Due to Koopman, B. (1930), von Neumann, J. (1932a)(1932b)(1932c) and
Birkhoff, G.D. (1931). Khinchin, A. (1932a)(1932b)(1933) and Hopf, E.
(1932)(1936)(1937) proposed a purely probabilistic formulation of this theorem, in
terms of a measure-preserving transformations.
37 It should be noted that, in the case of simple events, the asymptotic properties
are characterized by the limits of relative frequencies that converge to the respective
probabilities within each part, but are different for different parts and that the total
probability is given by the weighted mixture of these limits, where the weighs are
given by the partitions’ measures.
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to 1.  The ergodicity property implies, then, that an ergodic process has, in its entirety, the
same asymptotic properties, that is, it cannot be separated into parts and guarantees the
uniqueness of the limits of the relative frequencies of the outcome 
35.  E
The ergodic decomposition theorem
36 considers the relationship between the general concepts
of ergodicity and stationarity and shows that every stationary sequence admits an integral
representation in terms of stationary probabilities or, accordingly, a unique decomposition
weighted in ergodic parts (that is,  with identical asymptotic properties for each of the parts,
but different for the different parts), each of which can be defined as a subset of the set of
infinite sequences and whose weighs are given by the average time spent by the process in
each part
37. Suppose a non-ergodic transformation  , then, given an invariant set  , it will ( ) p • A
be verified that  . In addition, suppose there are two sets   and  ( ) pA> 0 A1 AA 21 =− Ω
containing no non-trivial invariant subsets, then the conditional probabilities   and ( ) pA • / 1
 will be ergodic an its integral representation will be ( ) pA • / 2
. Since   and  , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) pB pA pB A pA pB A =+ 11 22 // ( ) ( ) pA pA 12 1 += ( ) ( ) 01 12 << pA pA ,
it can be asserted that   is defined by a unique mixture of ergodic probabilities, where ( ) pB
 and   represent the weighs. In general, it can be asserted that, given a ( ) pA 1 ( ) pA 2
descomposition  , the integral over   of the ergodic probabilities  corresponding to ℑℑ ( ) pE D
the partitions   weighted by a function  , define a stationary probability D ( ) μ D
. ( ) ( ) ( ) pE p Ed D D =
ℑ
∫ μ
As a corollary of the above results, it is obtained that the sequences of exchangeable events38 The rigorous proof that the representation theorem is a special case of the
ergodic theorem is due Ryll-Nardzewski, C. (1957). In addition, see Freedman, D.
(1962) and Dynkin, E.B. (1978).
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are stationary, but with variable asymptotic properties due to the conditioning of the
probabilities and also that sequences of independent events are associated with an ergodic
measure. Then, since the Bernoullian measures satisfy the first law of large numbers and the
ergodicity property implies a limit behavior identical for all sequences, we can conclude that
the Bernoullian probabilities are ergodic and, therefore, that the classic representation theorem
is a particular case of the ergodic decomposition theorem, in which the probability   defines p
an ergodic component formed by the set of all sequences whose relative frequency converge
to 
38. p
In the ambit of ergodic theory the representation theorem can be interpreted as follows: while
the limit of relative frequency is unknown, the condition of exchangeability (that is, of
stationarity) guarantees its existence. In terms of a subjectivist approach, this "ignorance" can
be characterized by a mixture of its possible values in which the weighs of different
hypotheses emerge as personal assignations of assumed true values of the probabilities through
the Bayesian conditioning process and allow to obtain an intersubjective assessment of the
probability.
Now then, if the process is such that it admits a decomposition due to the existence of ergodic
partition which depends exclusively on the properties of the law that determines the trajectory
of the process, the weighs of the decomposition assume a physical meaning, which led some
authors to postulate that their distribution did not depend on the subjective characteristics of
Bayesian conditioning. But, given the axiomatic nature of the premises on which the
decomposition theorem is based on and, in contradiction to this proposition, it can be
concluded that its acceptance is of a purely subjective nature.
On the other hand, keeping in mind that propensity is a physical property of the experiment
design based on the assumption of a given structural behavior of the phenomenon and that its
interpretation of the probability concept is referred to individual events and considering a
definition of propensities based on the dynamic properties of a phenomenon that has a "real"
trajectory and, therefore, supports an explanation in terms of classical mechanics, it was shown
that it is possible to obtain an analytical justification of the propensity interpretation of ergodic
theory. This leads to the conclusion that the ergodic theory is affected by the same
metaphysical characteristics of the propensity model in which the assignment of probabilities
is inevitably subjective.
7.2 .- The method of arbitrary functions39 However, it should be noted that the subjectivist interpretation of the absolute
continuity condition leads to Savage, L.J.’s conjecture (1973) whereby the probability
functions can only be derived from other probability functions.
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As an alternative to justify the existence of a unique objective definition of probability in the
ambit of dynamic phenomena that support deterministic laws that determine its trajectory,
Poincaré, H. (1896) and von Smoluchowski, M. (1918) introduced the method of arbitrary
functions, which was widespread in the mathematical aspects by Fréchet, M. (1952), who
showed that the sufficient condition for its implementation is to have a continuous of
trajectories of the process and a density function on this set which, under certain conditions
attached to it, will be asymptotically transformed into a single final distribution.
Hopf, E. (1934)(1936), in accordance with the principle by which the schemes based on the
realization of a probability distribution “... cannot determine the true origin of the laws of
probability, since they are based on them” proposed a new interpretation of Poincare and von
Smoluchowski’s definitions based on the conjecture which claims that the analytical
justification of the method of arbitrary functions is exclusively found in ergodic theory (in
which, as seen in the previous section, the assumption of the existence of an initial distribution
is replaced by that of absolute continuity and the condition of independence is seen as a
byproduct of the continuity property), that in some cases the ergodic nature of a dynamic
phenomenon can be deductively determined and, therefore, that the method of arbitrary
functions allows, in these cases, the definition of objective probabilities
39.
The theoretical foundation of Hopf’s conjecture was provided by Sinai, Y. (1977), who
showed that, if the domain of states is subject to a finite partition into macro-states, the
succession of macro-states form a Bernoullian process, that is, a sequence in which the macro-
states are stochastically independent and their probabilities are determined exclusively by the
law governing the process trajectory.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Hopf's conjecture and the results obtained by Sinai refer
exclusively to phenomena whose behavior support an explanation in terms of classical
mechanics. On the other hand if, as in the factic phenomena, the absolute continuity condition
is not verified then, given the inevitable presence of random factors, the unique realization of
the process cannot be regarded as a necessary consequence of its deterministic representation.
It should be noted that, according to Khinchin, A. (1954), a necessary condition for the
convergence of relative frequencies is that the expected values of functions in the domain of
the states are independent of the initial distribution and that this condition does not hold for
singular distributions, so that for the case of unique trajectories, the ergodic theorems
postulates, and consequently, the laws of large numbers linking relative frequencies with
probabilities, are not verified.26
8. Conclusions
As a counterexample  to de Finetti’s "motto" which postulates that “the probability does not
exist”, some authors have proposed a form of strict identification of the true value of a
probability based on the exchangeability property, on the postulates of the representation
theorem and on its interpretation in the ambit of ergodic theory.
As proof of the inconsistency of this proposal, it was firstly demonstrated that, from a
subjectivist interpretation of the representation theorem it can be concluded that the statement
about the convergence of the relative frequency on a "true value " of the probability, in the
cases of Bernoullian phenomena, is not but a metaphysical illusion, which is actually
attributable to an asymptotic behavior of the individual assessments of the initial probabilities
according to a Bayesian conditioning scheme, which leads to an intersubjective assignment
easily confused with an objective probability.
With regard to the results obtained by Koopman, von Neumann, Birkhoff, Khinchin and Sinai
related to the principles of the ergodic partition theorem and the method of arbitrary functions,
their foundation on axiomatic nature premises (stating that the phenomena support a
deterministic explanation in terms of classic mechanics and satisfy the condition of absolute
continuity) allowed the conclusion that their acceptance is exclusively of a subjective nature.
Finally, as an immediate consequence of the analytical justification of the propensionalist
interpretation of ergodic theory, it was demonstrated that it is affected by the same
metaphysical characteristics of the propensity model in which the assignment of probabilities
is inevitably subjective.
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